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What are scientific models? Philosophers of science have been try-
ing to answer this question during the last three decades by putting
forward a number of different proposals. Some say that models are
best understood as abstract Platonic objects or fictional entities akin
to Sherlock Holmes, while others focus on their mathematical nature
and see them as set theoretical structures. Although each account has
its own strengths in offering various insights on the nature of models,
several objections have been raised against these views which still re-
main unanswered, making the debate on the ontology of models seem
unresolvable. The primary aim of this paper is to show that a large part
of these difficulties stems from an inappropriate reading of the main
question on the ontology of models as a purely metaphysical question.
Building on Carnap, it is argued that the question of the ontology of
scientific models is either (i) an internal theoretical question within an
already accepted linguistic framework or (ii) an external practical ques-
tion regarding the choice of the most appropriate form of language in
order to describe and explain the practice of scientific modelling. The
main implication of this view is that the question of the ontology of
models becomes a means of probing other related questions regarding
the overall practice of scientific modelling, such as questions on the
capacity of models to provide knowledge and the relation of models
with background theories.
1 Introduction
One of the most important activities in scientific inquiry is the construction
of models. Scientists use models for a number of different reasons – to
represent actual and imaginary systems, to learn things about these systems,
to test the implications of a theory, for educational purposes etc. – and these
models come in a variety of forms. A natural question to ask is therefore
[Q] What are scientific models?
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A long-standing debate in the literature on scientific models concerns the
possible answers to this question. While some authors have voiced their
scepticism that this question has a meaningful answer (Callender & Cohen
2006; Suárez 2004; French 2010), others have tried to give a more positive
note by arguing that models are best understood as real existing abstract
objects (Giere 1988; Psillos 2011), fictional entities (Godfrey-Smith 2006;
Frigg 2010; Toon 2010, 2012) and mathematical structures (van Fraassen
1980; Da Costa & French 2003). Each of these accounts comes with its own
strengths and weaknesses and faces its own difficulties in giving a conclusive
answer to the main question on the ontology of models.
The primary aim of this paper is to adopt a Carnapian meta-ontological
stance and show that some of these ostensibly insurmountable difficulties
stem from an inappropriate reading of [Q] as a purely metaphysical ques-
tion. Building on Carnap’s (1950/2012) tripartite distinction between (i)
internal questions (ii) external practical questions and (iii) external theoret-
ical questions, it will be shown that [Q] should be understood as an internal
theoretical question within an already accepted linguistic framework or an
external practical question regarding the choice of the most appropriate form
of language in order to describe and explain the practice of scientific mod-
elling. The further reading of [Q] as an external theoretical question, that
is, as a question about the real nature of models, independently of any form
of language that might be used to describe them, is deceptive and should be
avoided. The conclusion is that, from a Carnapian perspective, the debate
on the ontology of models is ultimately about the choice of an appropri-
ate language in order to describe the practice of scientific modelling, and
as such, it does not admit of a unique true answer. By adopting different
‘ontologies’ of models, philosophers are in effect advocating for the various
alternative ways by which one can understand the abstract nature of models
and their role in scientific inquiry.
Rather than arguing for the supremacy of a Carnapian meta-ontological
stance in general, the aim here is to take the Carnapian framework as a
working premise and demonstrate the implications and payoffs of this view
on the debate about the ontology of scientific models.1 It should also be
noted that if one is sceptical about the Carnapian programme in general,
there is nothing special in the debate about the ontology of models which
favours the adoption of a Carnapian stance specifically about this matter.
1Whether one has good reasons to adopt a neo-Carnapian stance in metaphysics in
general, is something that has been discussed extensively in the relevant literature and
the reader is referred to the original works of Carnap (Carnap, 1937, 1996, 2012; Carnap &
Schilpp, 1963) and Quine (1951a, 1951b, 1960) for more detailed arguments and responses.
In the more recent literature on meta-metaphysics, a number of compelling arguments
towards a neo-Carnapian point of view can be found in the works of Huw Price (Price
2004, 2007, 2009; Macarthur and Price 2007) and Amie Thomasson (2014). A number of
responses on the basis of neo-Quinean concerns can be found in the works of Sider (2009),
Finocchiaro (2019), and van Inwagen (2020).
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The aim is therefore not to argue that one should be a Carnapian with
respect to the ontology of models, regardless of one’s beliefs in other issues
of metaphysics. Rather, the aim is to illustrate that once one adopts the
Carnapian perspective, a number of issues in the debate are resolved and
the focus can be shifted to other non-trivial questions about the general
practice of scientific modelling. Carnap’s motivation in applying his method
to metaphysics was to bring to philosophy the kind of progress that is usually
found in the natural sciences, and this paper aims in showing how this
progress can be achieved in the debate about the ontology of models by
applying the Carnapian method.
In particular, the proposed understanding of the debate in Carnapian
terms teaches us that the choice of an appropriate linguistic framework –
i.e. the choice of an appropriate ontology – is only a practical matter rel-
ative to the aims for which the language is introduced. Hence, given that
the aim of philosophical investigations on the nature of scientific models is
to understand as much as possible about their function as epistemological
tools in science, the various existing accounts should not be seen as com-
peting and mutually exclusive theories aiming to find a unique true answer
to the question of the ontology of models. Rather, they should be seen as
complementary accounts that enable us to understand the different aspects
of modelling. The main implication of this view is that the question of the
ontology of models is only taken as a means of probing other related ques-
tions regarding the overall practice of scientific modelling, such as questions
on the capacity of models to provide knowledge and the relation of models
with background theories.
This realization effectively dissolves the debate on the ontology of mod-
els and urges philosophers to move forward, by arguing that there is nothing
more to be gained in trying to settle on a unique true answer to the question
of the ontology of models. The main argument is that the two proposed read-
ings of [Q] jointly provide all the necessary conceptual tools for developing a
robust theory of models, whilst keeping away from the various insuperable
challenges faced by the aforementioned existing accounts. The onus is thus
on the proponents of such views in the sense that they need to show what
the extra benefit of attempting to settle on a conclusive answer is.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the problem of the
ontology of models is described in more detail with references to the relevant
literature. In Section 3, Carnap’s distinction between internal and external
questions is presented, followed by a discussion of how this distinction can
be exploited for the development of a theory of models. Section 4 discusses
French’s main argument for quietism as a possible route towards a pragmatic
approach. The argument is found susceptible to a number of objections and
thus further justification is needed. Finally, in Section 5, an objection to
the proposed pragmatic approach is addressed. The conclusion is that the
objection does not succeed in rendering pragmatism about the ontology of
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models an unattractive position.
2 The problem of the ontology of models
More than thirty years ago, Giere (1988) presented a theory of models as
abstract systems that possess the properties ascribed to them and satisfy
the equations by which they are governed. Giere’s theory has been highly
influential in the large discussion that followed regarding the ontology of sci-
entific models, and which still carries on unresolved. By separating models
from their descriptions, Giere ascribed to the former a status of independent
abstract entities for which certain ontological questions regarding their ex-
istence and nature should be answered. With this in mind, Thomson-Jones
(2010) has more recently described scientific models as ‘missing systems’.
These missing systems have the surface appearance of a precise description
of actual concrete objects, however, we know that there are no such objects
in the actual world fitting that description. The challenge is therefore to
find an appropriate way to understand the nature of scientific models as
missing systems, and it is often referred to as ‘the problem of the ontology
of models’.
A further motivation for tackling the question of the ontology of models
is the fact that it is closely connected to the puzzling question of scientific
representation; that is, the question of the exact nature of the relation-
ship between models and the physical systems they represent, which Giere
described in terms of similarity. The standard argument is that if repre-
sentation is a relation between models and physical systems, and if models
indeed carry some kind of representational capacity, then the only way to
flesh out the nature of this relation is by providing a detailed ontology of
models.
It is no surprise then that several attempts have been made so far to
provide a positive account on the ontology of models. For example, follow-
ing Giere, Psillos (2011) takes models to be real existing abstract objects,
whereas authors like Godfrey-Smith (2006), Frigg (2010) and Toon (2010,
2012) have argued that models are useful fictions which, literally speaking,
do not exist. An alternative approach, stemming from the seminal works
of Suppes (1960) and van Fraassen (1980) on the semantic view of theories,
focuses on the mathematical aspect of models and sees them as mathe-
matical structures that represent physical targets in terms of some form of
isomorphism. Da Costa and French (2003) are also strong opponents of this
approach.2
This ongoing reflection on the problem of the ontology of models dur-
ing the last three decades has, unsurprisingly, led to a further discussion
2For a recent review of the literature on the ontology of models see Gelfert (2017). See
also Frigg and Nguyen (2017) for a review of model-based theories of representation.
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regarding the metaphysics of abstract objects and their properties, bring-
ing forward a host of difficult and well-known problems in traditional meta-
physics. A standard objection against the abstract objects view concerns the
attribution of physical properties to abstract systems (Teller, 2001, p.399;
Thomson-Jones, 2010, p.290). If models are existing abstract objects with
no spatiotemporal location, then how is it possible for them to instantiate
the spatiotemporal properties that make them similar to their targets? Sim-
ilarly, against the fictionalist view the objection is that it is hard to see how
a non-existing entity stands as a representation of a physical system in a way
that allows a fruitful comparison between the two (Morrison, 2015, p.89).
As for the structuralist approach, a standard worry is that if models are
mathematical structures, then it is hard to understand how they stand in
isomorphic relations with real systems (Frigg & Nguyen, 2017, p.71). What
does it mean for a physical system to possess a structure, and where in that
system is the structure located? These and other criticisms along these lines
often come forward as challenges for all three main accounts on the ontology
of models making the problem of ontology seem unresolvable.
French (2010) was the first to clearly point out the futility of trying
to give a conclusive answer to the question of the ontology of models. By
putting forward a quietist approach, French claimed that when it comes
to questions about the real ontology of models and theories one should
remain silent. Such a quietist conclusion musters support from the fact that
metaphysical questions about the ontology of models and theories are both
unanswerable and unnecessary, given that our aim is to understand and
explain the scientific practice. This gives rise to the following two questions
that need to be addressed:
[1] Can we answer questions about the ontology of models?
[2] Do we need to answer questions about the ontology of models in order
to understand and explain the practice of scientific modelling?
Notice how these two questions are connected with the central question
of the ontology of models. The first question asks whether or not [Q] is an
answerable question, while the second asks whether or not answering [Q]
is necessary in order to have a fruitful theory of models. In what follows,
it will be shown that the answer to these questions depends on whether
[Q] is understood as an internal or external question in a Carnapian sense.
As will become clear in Section 3, an understanding of [Q] as either an
internal question or an external practical question trivialises both [1] and
[2] and allows for a positive answer. This approach takes all references
to abstract entities merely as a fruitful and efficient way of talking about
scientific models and stays away from any form of metaphysical enquiry on
the nature and existence of abstract entities. On the other hand, if [Q] is
understood as an external theoretical question regarding the real ontological
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status of models, it then becomes a pseudo-question and therefore the answer
to these questions is negative.
3 Unfolding the pragmatic approach
3.1 Internal and External questions
Carnap’s principal goal in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ (1950/2012)
is to clarify an ongoing bewilderment deriving from, what he calls, the prob-
lem of abstract entities. That is, the problem of referring to abstract enti-
ties, such as properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions etc., while
at the same time remaining faithful to the basic principles of empiricism and
avoiding any sort of commitment to a metaphysical ontology of a Platonic
nature.3 What Carnap aims to show is that accepting a linguistic frame-
work which involves reference to these abstract entities, does not imply the
acceptance of the reality or existence of these entities in the traditional
metaphysical sense, as understood, for instance, in the context of Platonism
in mathematics. To be a Platonist about mathematical entities is to hold
the view that abstract mathematical objects exist independently of us and
our language. Carnap’s claim is that existence claims about such entities
are only meaningful within a linguistic framework.
A linguistic framework is a system of possible ways of speaking about
new kinds of entities, subject to certain rules. In other words, it is a set
of rules dictating the use of certain terms and predicates referring to new
entities, such as properties and numbers, in order to be able to speak mean-
ingfully about a given subject. Given a linguistic framework, Carnap makes
a distinction between three types of questions concerning the existence or
reality of the introduced abstract entities: (i) internal questions, (ii)external
practical questions and (iii) external theoretical questions. As we shall see,
for Carnap, the first two types of questions are legitimate and often trivial,
whereas the latter is problematic. This may come as a surprise to those who
read Carnap as rejecting all external questions, but as will be shown below,
this is not the case. Carnap does welcome external statements about the
existence of abstract entities, insofar as they are understood in a practical
and pragmatic fashion.
Internal questions are questions asked within a linguistic framework and
for which the answer can be found either by logical analysis or empirical
3What is interesting here is that although Carnap explicitly states in the very first
paragraph of his text (2012, p.241) that his focus is on abstract entities like numbers,
properties etc., his overall approach is a general one against ontology and his distinctions
essentially apply to all kinds of existence questions, including existence questions about
physical entities such as electrons, black holes and so on. This point becomes clear later
on through Carnap’s thing-language example which will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
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observation. For instance, to use Carnap’s example (2012, pp.244-5), once
we accept the linguistic framework for numbers, the question ‘Is there a
prime number greater than a hundred?’ is an internal question and the
answer can be found by analysing the rules of the linguistic framework for
numbers. In other words, in order to answer this question one merely has
to check whether or not the existence of such a number follows from the
rules of the already accepted system of numbers within which the question
is raised. Questions like ‘Is there a piece of paper on my desk’ are internal
questions within the framework of the ‘thing-language’ – i.e. the linguistic
framework we use to speak about the external world – and the answer to such
questions is a matter of empirical observation, since the rules of our chosen
thing-language imply that a physical object exists if it can be empirically
observed. Both logical and empirical internal questions are thus subject to
the internal rules of the relevant linguistic framework. Internal questions are
therefore theoretical ; that is, they are questions for which there is a definite
answer that follows logically or empirically from the rules of the relevant
framework.
Internal questions are often (but not always) trivial, in the sense that a
positive answer says nothing more than that the given linguistic framework
is not empty. For instance, the question whether there exists a real number
between five and six is trivial, since the answer comes easily from the rules of
the linguistic framework for real numbers. Examples of less trivial internal
questions are questions whether ‘glueballs’ exist4 or whether there is a prime
number between nine billion and nine billion and ten for instance. What
makes an internal question non-trivial is the fact that the empirical obser-
vations about the existence of an entity may not be so clear – e.g. in the
case of glueballs – or the fact that the application of the internal rules of the
chosen linguistic framework may require extensive computational analysis –
e.g. in the case of very large prime numbers.
External theoretical questions on the other hand, concern the existence
of the system of abstract entities as a whole, prior to the acceptance of
a new linguistic framework. Such questions are not raised within the sci-
entific community or in common parlance, rather they are typically asked
by philosophers in traditional metaphysics when, for instance, they pose
the metaphysical question of the existence of natural numbers or the re-
ality of the external world. What philosophers usually mean when they
raise these questions is ‘whether or not numbers [for instance] have a cer-
tain metaphysical characteristic called reality [...] or subsistence or status
of independent entities’ (ibid., p.245). These ontological questions must be
4In particle physics, glueballs are hypothetical colourless particles that consist only of
interacting gluons without any valence quarks. The existence of glueballs is predicted by
Quantum Chromodynamics but the results of various indirect experimental observations
are still not universally accepted. For a relatively non-technical review of the physics of
glueballs and their connection with the MIT bag model, see Mathieu et al. (2009).
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raised and answered, according to this approach, before the introduction of
the new language. Hence, questions like ‘Do numbers really exist?’ or ‘Is
the external world real?’ are external to the linguistic framework since the
answer to these questions is supposedly independent of the language we use
to speak about numbers and material things.
The problem with such external theoretical questions, Carnap says, is
that they are devoid of any cognitive content; they are pseudo-questions.
That is, they are ill-formed questions in the sense that they are ‘disguised
in the form of a theoretical question while in fact [they are] non-theoretical’
(ibid., p.245, emphasis added). These disguised external questions cannot
be answered, simply because it is impossible to frame them in terms of the
common scientific language in a way which succeeds in giving them any
cognitive content. To see why, recall that accepting a certain linguistic
framework amounts to accepting a set of statements regarding the existence
and nature of the abstract entities in question. For instance, within the sys-
tem of numbers, the assertion that there is a prime number larger than one
hundred simply states that this prime number is an element of the already
accepted linguistic framework. However, the further external question of
whether such a number really exists, is not part of the set of the accepted
statements since it cannot be formulated in a meaningful way within this
framework or any other theoretical language. In other words, the concept of
existence cannot be applied to the system itself independently and prior to
the acceptance of a given framework. As an alleged opponent of Carnap on
this matter pointed out in a rather astute way, ‘to ask what reality is really
like [...] apart from human categories, is self-stultifying. It is like asking
how long the Nile really is, apart from parochial matters of miles or meters’
(Quine, 1992, p.9).5
Another useful way to understand Carnap’s view on external statements
is to compare them with moral statements under the scope of the more famil-
iar doctrine of non-cognitivism in Ethics. For the non-cognitivists, moral
statements such as ‘Killing is evil’ do not have any propositional content
and thereby do not have any truth conditions. Rather, they only express
beliefs and other non-cognitive attitudes such as revulsion and disapproval.6
As one of the first non-cognitivists, Carnap also drew an analogy between
metaphysical and ethical claims in his earlier works (1935/1996, pp.22-30;
1937, p.278) stating that the latter are mere commands in a misleading
5Contrary to the seemingly widespread view among philosophers which sees Quine as
saving metaphysics from Carnap, this quote from Quine goes on to suggest that Quine’s
views on metaphysics are, to a large extent, on par with Carnap’s meta-ontological stance.
Price (2007, 2009) and more recently Verhaegh (2017) provide a convincing line of argu-
ments to this direction showing that not only Quine does not undermine Carnap’s main
thesis, but in addition he ‘overtakes him, and pushes further in the same direction’ (Price,
2007, p.393).
6See van Roojen (2018), Blackburn (2006), and Schroeder (2010, esp. Ch.2) for more
on Moral Noncognitivism.
8
grammatical form, and thus they should not be treated as assertions. Sim-
ilarly, metaphysical statements related to external questions – e.g. that
numbers really exist independently of the adopted linguistic framework –
only have an expressive function in that they only express personal beliefs.
Nonetheless, they have no theoretical content and thus they should not be
treated as truth-apt assertions.
This is not the end of the story however. External questions are in-
deed non-cognitive but this does not mean that they should be thrown out
of the window. Rather, Carnap’s insightful remark is that such questions
should be understood as practical questions concerning the choice of a lin-
guistic framework over another and the structure of rules within them. In
other words, external questions like ‘Do numbers really exist?’ are questions
concerning whether or not we should accept a linguistic framework with ref-
erence to numbers. However, the acceptance of a given framework, which
further implies the acceptance of a set of (internal) statements regarding
the existence of new entities, cannot be judged as being true or false simply
because it does not involve an assertion. Rather, it is a matter of a deci-
sion guided merely by pragmatic criteria such as the efficiency, fruitfulness
and simplicity of the new language and the degree in which these new ways
of speaking are conducive to the purposes for which the language was ini-
tially introduced. Nonetheless, the fact that a given language, such as the
numbers-language for instance, turns out to be extremely efficient does not
provide any sort of confirming evidence for the reality of numbers in the
traditional metaphysical sense.
Before moving to the next section, it is important to stress the difference
between internal theoretical questions and external practical questions. For
Carnap, these are the only two legitimate ways to read existence related
questions. The former admit of definite answers depending on the rules of
the framework in which they are expressed, and thus, any internal assertion
needs to be justified either by empirical evidence or logical analysis. External
practical questions on the other hand, are questions of degree, and just
like any other practical question, they do not admit of a definite answer.
Rather, the answer to these kind of questions depends on pragmatic criteria
relative to the purposes for which a linguistic framework is used. The further
reading of external questions as theoretical questions for which a definite
answer must be given stems from the fact that external questions are usually
grammatically disguised as internal theoretical questions. However, this
reading is problematic and should be avoided.7
7For further contemporary discussions on the distinction between internal and exter-
nal questions, as well as on the debate between Carnap and Quine on metaphysics see
Bird (1995), Yablo (1998), Alspector-Kelly (2001), Eklund (2013), Verhaegh (2017, 2018),
Morris (2018) and Flocke (2018). Blatti and Lapointe (2016) is a comprehensive collection
of essays on Carnap’s overall approach on ontology and metaphysics.
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3.2 Theories of ontology as competing frameworks
Carnap’s conclusion is that the problem of abstract entities is a result of
a failure to acknowledge this fundamental distinction between internal and
external questions and I want to argue that the same holds for a large part
of the debate around the ontology of models. The nature of the objections
discussed in Section 2 and the fact that the debate appears to be unresolved
show that [Q] is sometimes treated in the relevant literature as an external
theoretical question for which there is a definite answer. However, from
a Carnapian point of view, this reading is problematic and only succeeds
in making [Q] an unintelligible pseudo-question. The suggestion here is
that [Q] should be seen either as an internal theoretical question or an
external practical question. The central question of the ontology of models
is thus ambiguous and as we shall see, both readings are legitimate and
serve different purposes. On the contrary, the further reading of [Q] as an
external theoretical question does not seem to improve our understanding
of scientific models in a fruitful way and is therefore unnecessary. Let us
elaborate on each one of these three options, beginning with the second.
As formulated above, [Q] is a question about which kind of abstract en-
tities is to be identified with scientific models. As such, it can be understood
as an external practical question asking: ‘What is the most appropriate and
efficient form of language to describe scientific models?’. Given that this is
a practical question, it only depends on pragmatic criteria and admits of
multiple ‘equally true’ answers. The preference for a particular linguistic
framework in the case of scientific models therefore depends on the specific
desiderata for choosing an ontology of models over another. Philosophers
like Giere and Psillos opt for an abstract-objects-language (albeit with some
differences) because they are primarily interested in explaining the attri-
bution of physical properties like mass and momentum to highly idealized
‘non-existing’ systems, such as the model of a particle in a one-dimensional
box in quantum mechanics. For Giere, an extra motivation for choosing an
abstract-objects ontology is the development of a theory of representation
in terms of similarity, whereby models and their targets share some of their
properties. On the other hand, van Fraassen’s state space approach focuses
on the mathematical nature of models and aims in capturing the ability of
the latter to represent the evolution of the states of physical systems in time
by the abstract nature of mathematical state spaces. Different accounts
thus serve different desiderata and complement each other in that they offer
different insights on the nature of models.
Both of these views are entirely legitimate, and none of them should be
judged as true or false simply because they should not be seen as assertions
about the real ontology of models. The various accounts on the ontology of
models should only be seen as representing different linguistic frameworks
for speaking about scientific models in a fruitful and efficient way. The only
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meaningful comparison between them is therefore with regard to their suc-
cess in being conducive to the aim for which they were initially introduced;
namely, the aim of explaining as much of scientific talk about models as pos-
sible. What this means may vary from case to case and ultimately depends
on the desired explananda of each account. Nevertheless, the ultimate aim
should not be to give a definite answer to [Q], but to understand various
related questions about models such as how scientists build and use scientific
models in different disciplines, what makes a model a good or bad epistemo-
logical tool for acquiring knowledge about a physical system, why scientists
often use inconsistent models to represent the same physical system, what
the relationship of models with their background theories and the experi-
mental data is, what it means for a model to be empirically inadequate and
so on.
Now within a chosen linguistic framework for models, say an abstract-
objects-language, further questions arise regarding the existence and the
exact nature of models qua abstract objects. These questions are internal to
the framework and thus they are theoretical. Given that one has accepted an
abstract-objects-language for models, the question ‘Do these abstract models
exist?’ is trivial and the answer is of course positive.8 The further question
of the exact nature of these models depends on the internal rules of the
framework and the introduced mechanisms for ascribing physical properties
to abstract entities.
As an example, consider the familiar case of the ideal pendulum from
classical mechanics. Introducing a framework which sees the ideal pendulum
as an abstract object implies that the further (internal) statement ‘there
exists an abstract object which has all the properties of the ideal pendulum’
is trivially true in the sense that such an object is an element of the chosen
framework. However, claiming that the abstract ideal pendulum exists,
does not amount to any sort of ontological commitment of a Platonic nature
simply because it is not an external statement regarding the real existence
of such entities independently of the chosen framework. Nor does the fact
that such a language may be proven extremely efficient provide any sort
of evidence towards these claims. Rather, it merely ‘makes it advisable’ to
accept the specific framework in the sense that it provides all the necessary
conceptual and linguistic tools to understand certain aspects of scientific
modelling, such as the fact that physicists do indeed seem to refer to abstract
objects with spatio-temporal properties when talking about ideal pendulums
and frictionless inclined planes.
The further reading of [Q] and other related questions as external the-
8Things become a bit more complicated in the case of fictionalism, since this doctrine
explicitly denies the existence of abstract entities. Part of this complication stems from
the fictionalist’s failure to acknowledge the distinction between internal and external state-
ments, making fictional statements seem contradictory in the sense that although models
do not exist they possess physical properties.
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oretical questions is not a viable option. For the Carnapian philosopher of
science, this reading of [Q] as a question of the real ontology of scientific
models, over and beyond any linguistic framework we may use to describe
them, is both misleading and unnecessary. It is misleading because, as a
supposedly theoretical question, it implicitly assumes that there is a defi-
nite answer to the question of the ontology and other related questions on
the existence and the metaphysical nature of models. However, insofar as
such questions cannot be formulated in a way that renders them intelligible
and for which an efficient methodology can be suggested towards their res-
olution, they remain pseudo-questions and thus should be discarded. It is
also unnecessary because the alternative understanding of these questions as
external practical questions or internal questions within a chosen framework
is sufficient for a fruitful explanation of the practice of scientific modelling.
From a Carnapian point of view, there is thus nothing more to be gained
by pursuing metaphysical questions about the existence and the real nature
of the abstract entities that are often found in theories of models, and the
burden of proof is on those who suggest otherwise. Namely, they need
to make clear what the extra benefits of pursuing metaphysical (external
theoretical) questions are, compared to the proposed Carnapian reading
which remains completely neutral as to any kind of ontological commitments
in the traditional metaphysical sense. The main advantage of the suggested
Carnapian take on the question of the ontology of models is that it paves
the way for making progress in understanding the function and nature of
scientific models by answering the question of the ontology in an internal
sense. We thus have no compelling reasons to consider the pursuit of further
metaphysical questions about scientific models as a worthwhile task. What
is at stake in the long-standing debate on the ontology of models is not a
conclusive answer to the question per se, rather, the extent to which the
different choices of language illuminate different aspects of the nature and
function of scientific models.9
9Based on Quine’s (1951) famous response to Carnap, one may express a neo-Quinean
objection at this point, arguing that internal questions are ultimately just as pragmatic
as external ones, and hence, there is no definite internal answer to the question of the
ontology of models either. As mentioned in the introduction, Carnap’s meta-ontological
stance is taken as a working premise and the defence of Carnap’s programme against
well-known objections like this one is beyond the scope of this paper. However, let us just
briefly note that the aim of this paper is to show that the reading of [Q] as an external
theoretical question is partly responsible for the lack of progress in the debate about the
ontology of models. This conclusion is based on Carnap’s doctrine that external questions
are ultimately practical questions, which essentially remains unharmed by Quine’s claim
that internal questions are also pragmatic. The further claim that there is no definite
internal answer to the question of the ontology of models even within a chosen linguistic
framework is also orthogonal to the argument provided here. Whether or not an internal
ontological claim is ultimately a pragmatic issue does not really affect the main claim of
this paper, namely, that the question of the ontology of models should only be taken as a
means of probing other related questions on the function and nature of scientific models
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As for the further questions [1] and [2], it should be clear by now that
the answer to these questions depends on how one reads [Q]. Recall that
question [1] asks whether we can provide an answer to the question of the
ontology of models [Q] and question [2] whether answering this question is
necessary for our purposes as philosophers of science. If [Q] is seen as an
external practical question, then [1] merely asks whether we can come up
with an appropriate linguistic framework that captures scientific modelling
and the answer is of course positive. Similarly, the answer to [2] is also
positive since if our aim is to understand what models are, we of course
need an efficient linguistic framework to describe them. If [Q] is seen as an
internal question, then [1] asks whether we can describe the nature of models
within a particular linguistic framework, and the answer to this question is
again positive and follows from the specified internal rules of the preferred
framework. For the same reasons, the answer to question [2] is trivially
positive as well.
If [Q] is seen as an external theoretical question, then question [1] asks
whether we are able to determine the ontology of models in a language-
independent way and the answer is negative since, from the Carnapian point
of view, it is simply impossible to provide an answer to an external theoret-
ical answer. Similarly, question [2] asks whether it is necessary to answer
these external theoretical questions about models in order to understand
and explain the general practice of scientific modelling and the answer is
again negative, since the main motivation of the Carnapian approach is pre-
cisely the claim that external theoretical questions do not pose any serious
concerns towards our philosophical understanding of various issues. Rather,
they often have the opposite effect of impeding our philosophical enquiries.
The upshot is that the answer to the two meta-questions [1] and [2] aris-
ing from French’s discussion on the philosophy of the ontology of models
depends on how one understands the central question [Q]. Reading [Q] as
an internal theoretical question or an external practical question allows a
positive answer to [1] and [2], whereas reading [Q] as an external theoretical
question makes the answers to these questions negative.
This does not amount to an outright quietism about the ontology of
models however. It is simply a reminder that ontological questions about
scientific models do not lie within the sphere of metaphysics. Models are
not ‘creatures of darkness’, as Quine (1956, p.180) once called ‘intensions’
and other non-physical entities, and the question of their ontology is not a
metaphysical matter. Rather, they are epistemological tools used by scien-
tists and the answer to the question of what models are is to be found in
the domains that they are being practically used and studied by scientists,




The next section explores French’s quietism and shows how this ap-
proach lies within the sphere of the suggested pragmatic anti-metaphysical
approach. In accordance with pragmatism, French denies that there is a
unique true answer to matters of the ontology of models and suggests that
the way forward is to choose the ‘ontology’ which best represents scientific
models without worrying if this ontology is actually true.
4 French’s quietism
As already noted in Section 2, French’s quietism stems from two major
claims. The first claim is that questions about the ontological status of
models are unanswerable, in the sense that no unique and true answer can
be given which covers all kinds of models. In other words, questions re-
garding the real ontology of models cannot be answered. The second claim
takes a step further and asserts that the inability to arrive at definite an-
swers to these questions should not concern us since it does not impede
our efforts as philosophers of science. That is, we need not answer these
questions in order to understand the function and nature of models. The
conclusion is therefore that, rather than searching for an objectively true
answer, one should focus instead on finding the most appropriate way to
represent models and theories as having a certain ontological status, based
exclusively on pragmatic grounds. In what follows, French’s main argument
towards a pragmatic view is evaluated and found susceptible to a number of
objections. The upshot is that a pragmatic approach cannot and need not
be based on the fact that the term ‘model’ is not a sortal term.10
4.1 Models and sortals
French’s main argument towards our inability to answer ontological ques-
tions about scientific models is based on the concept of sortals. Its structure
can be given as follows:
[A1] The terms ‘theory’ and ‘models’ are not sortal terms.
[A2] Ontological questions about terms that are not sortal are unanswer-
able.
[A3] Therefore, ontological questions about theories and models are unan-
swerable.
10French’s discussion equally revolves around both theories and models since the two
terms are mostly used interchangeably throughout the text. The main reason for this
is French’s belief that the function and nature of models and theories cannot be sharply
distinguished (ibid., p.241). In what follows, the discussion is limited to models, assuming,
rather safely, that even though it is not made explicit in the text, most of French’s claims
about theories apply to models as well, and vice versa.
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In general, a term is sortal only if it gives a criterion of identity and
countability about a thing. That is, if X is a sortal term, then when con-
fronted with instances of X, one should be able to both identify them as
Xs and count them. For example, the term ‘owl’ is a sortal term since it
is clear which entities count as owls and which not, whereas terms such as
‘gold’ or ‘heap’ are not, since the former is uncountable and the latter has
no clear identity conditions.11 Moreover, according to some views, a sor-
tal also tells us when something continues to exist and when it goes out
of existence. Sortals are therefore terms that designate entities for which
identity and persistence conditions are clearly determined. Consequently,
sortals typically refer to entities of a single ontological kind and therefore,
ontological questions about sortals are easier to pursue.12
French’s starting point for justifying [A1] is the observation that when
we ask questions like ‘What is the ontological status of theories and models?’
we are treating these terms as sortals, since what we are doing is to ‘[take]
the term theory [or model] and ask what it is that this term picks out, what
is its referent’ (ibid., p.240). However, the great heterogeneity of different
types of models makes it impossible to define what a model is in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions, and therefore we lack the desired
identity criterion. Just like the term ‘works of art’, for example, covers too
broad a spectrum of an entity (e.g. novels, paintings, sculptures etc.) so
does the term ‘scientific models’, and thus the question of the ontological
status of models is unanswerable in the sense that there is no unique answer
(ibid., p.241). Moreover, French points out that whether or not one aims
for a unified answer to the question of the ontology of models depends on
one’s understanding of models and their relationship with theories. An
understanding of models as some sort of extensions of theories suggests for
a single and unified answer, whereas an understanding of models as having
a different nature and function than theories, such as in Cartwright et al.
(1995) and Morrison and Morgan (1999), suggests that models and theories
refer to two different things for which different answers should be given
(ibid., p.242).
The same can be said for the persistence criterion, since it is not clear
when a theory comes into existence and when (and if) it ceases to exist.
French wonders: ‘did General Relativity just pop into existence when Ein-
11The terms countable and uncountable are used here in the ordinary grammatical
sense and should not be confused with uncountability in set theory. Countable nouns
refer to discrete objects that can be counted – e.g. owls, electrons, planets etc. – whereas
uncountable nouns stand for things that are treated as an undifferentiated unit, rather
than as something with discrete elements – e.g. gold, electricity, music etc.
12There are various views in the literature as to where the term ‘sortal’ applies (univer-
sals, concepts or the things themselves) and French is not explicit on which interpretation
he adopts. Following Quine (1960), the term ‘sortal’ will be treated here as a linguis-
tic notion applying to predicates, since this approach is compatible with French’s overall
discussion.
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stein thought it up? And when exactly did he do that? Did it partially come
into existence in October 1914 and only fully the next year after Einstein’s
correspondence with Hilbert?’ (ibid., p.239). Replace General Relativity
with Bohr’s model of the hydrogen atom and the same argument holds for
models. Did Bohr’s model come into existence partially as he was gradually
developing it? Or did it suddenly come into existence with the publication
of his paper in 1913?
[A2] is supported by the fact that the scientific practices which are
supposed to determine the identity and persistence conditions of models
draw no sharp lines on whether something should be seen as a model or
not. For instance, they do not tell us how much of a model could be altered
in order for it to remain the same model, or when the model comes into
existence. Hence, this lack of any determinate conditions of identity and
persistence makes it hard to see how we can arrive at some determinate
answers. In other words, one cannot say what the ontological status of a
model is, if one is not sure what the referent of that term is or when the
term actually refers to something.13
There are two possible ways of response to this argument by challenging
each one of its premises. First, one might reject the concept of sortals as
an ill-defined concept and press for a definite answer to the question of
what exactly makes a predicate a sortal term. Is it the fact that there are
clear identity criteria for the term’s referents or the ability to distinguish
certain things as being instances of that predicate? One might argue for
example that even though no clear identity criterion or criteria for what
counts as a model can be formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions, surely it is still possible to distinguish and count different cases
of models. For instance, physicists have no problems in distinguishing the
Fermi gas model of the nucleus from the shell model; and as a matter of
fact, there are over thirty different models of the nucleus, each based on
different assumptions, which can nonetheless be classified in various ways.14
It is therefore possible, at least in principle, to identify and enumerate all
cases of models in physics say, or even all cases of models across all scientific
fields, by making a long open-ended list and leaving any ambiguous cases
aside. Once this list is done, one may take its contents as the referents of
the term ‘models’ and thus treat the term as a sortal.
What is more, the desirable identity and persistence conditions given
by sortals turn out to be problematic even in cases which prima facie seem
clear examples of sortals, such as the term ‘apple’. This is because, just
as in the case of models and theories, the spatial and temporal boundaries
13What is presented here is a summary of French’s argument as it appears throughout
Section 3 of his paper (pp.238-243), which relies heavily on Thomasson’s (2006) discussion
on the ontology of art.
14See Greiner and Maruhn (1996) for a book-length classification of nuclear models
based on degrees of freedom.
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for something to be considered as an apple are not as clear as one might
first think. To see why, compare French’s questions on the identity and
persistence conditions of General Relativity with questions on the identity
and persistence of apples. When does an apple come into existence? Does it
come partially as it develops from a blossom into a hard mass fruit? If no,
at what time then does it stop being a blossom and count as an apple? And
how big of a bite can someone take after which the apple stops to exist?15 If
even in these simple cases no clear identity and persistence conditions can be
given, it is then hard to see when a term successfully counts as a sortal, and
more importantly, it is even harder to see why it is a necessary condition for
a term to be sortal in order to ask ontological questions about its referents
as [A2] implies.
Even if we accept a certain definition for sortals, and grant that models
and theories are not sortal terms, we can thus still question the second
premise of the argument which after all carries the most important weight.
That is, we can deny that it is a necessary condition for a term to be sortal
in order to ask ontological questions about its referents and thus deny that
ontological questions about models are unanswerable. Take the term ‘gold’,
for instance. Even though it is not a sortal term according to the above
definition, it is clear that one can still answer ontological questions regarding
the nature of gold. What is more, even if we accept that non-sortal terms
such as ‘works of art’ and ‘models’ refer to entities of various ontological
kinds, one might maintain that different classes of models pick out objects
of different ontological kinds, but nonetheless we can categorise these kinds
and make separate ontological claims for each one of them. This is the line
followed by Contessa (2010) for example, who argues that models should
be categorised in three kinds – material models, mathematical models and
fictional models – for which questions about their ontological status can be
answered separately.
French is fully aware of this possibility, hence his conclusion is not that
the question of the ontological status of models is inherently unanswerable
tout court, rather it is the much weaker claim that it is unanswerable in the
sense that no single unified answer of the form ‘all models are F’s’, where F
is a specific ontological kind, can be given. It is hard to see how this leads to
quietism however. The fact that several answers can be given to the question
of ontology does not imply that the question cannot be answered. French’s
observation that models are not sortal terms nicely demonstrates the vast
array of scientific models and the unsystematic use of the term by scientists,
which make the task of developing a comprehensive theory of models ex-
tremely difficult. However, as an argument towards quietism it suffers both
15This argument against the temporal and spatial boundaries of the extensions of pred-
icates is found in Teller (2018), although in a completely different context, in an attempt
to show that all human knowledge is inaccurate.
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from the fact that the concept of sortals is ill-defined and from Contessa’s
alternative tripartite approach. The argument thereby does not succeed in
showing that the question of the ontology of models is unanswerable, nor
does it show that it is not worth pursuing. The good news however, is that
all French needs in order to defend the stronger claim that questions about
the real ontology of models cannot be answered, is the Carnapian rejection
of the disguised external questions as pseudo-questions.
Once this is done, all we need for quietism to follow is to show that
answering these questions is unnecessary. French easily achieves this by
developing an argument based on the work of Peirce (1940) showing that
external ontological questions about the real nature of scientific models are
not genuine questions since they do not impede in any way our enquiries
as philosophers of science (ibid., pp.243-4). The upshot is that a fruitful
theory of scientific representation does not require any kind of metaphysical
assertions about the existence of abstract entities. What is needed is a mod-
erate representational attitude guided only by pragmatic criteria. Whether
one finally concludes that models are best seen as mathematical structures
or fictional objects, is merely a result of a pragmatic choice based on the
ability of the competing theories to explain the nature and function of sci-
entific models in the best possible way, admitting as few counterexamples
as possible.16
Following these observations, French’s quietism does not seem to be as
radical as one might first think. Instead, it can be interpreted as stating
that external theoretical questions about the real ontology of models do not
hamper our efforts towards developing a theory of models since they can
be replaced by external practical questions and internal questions within a
chosen linguistic framework. Once this premise is granted, quietism about
the metaphysics of models follows naturally.
5 Thomson-Jones against the bracketing of meta-
physics
In this last section a possible objection to the proposed view on the ontology
of models is addressed. This objection comes from Thomson-Jones (2017,
pp.244-5) who, as opposed to French, argues extensively that bracketing
metaphysical questions in philosophy of science impedes our overall under-
standing on issues like the ontology of models and scientific representation.
In order to fully appreciate his argument, consider a theory [T] contain-
ing a statement [t] referring to abstract objects which, nonetheless, remains
neutral as to the existence of these objects:
[t] Scientific models are abstract objects.
16French (2017) reinforces this view in a more recent paper.
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By formulating theories in this way, one is engaging with what Thomson-
Jones calls the ‘as-if practice’, namely the practice of talking as if there are
X’s (in this case abstract objects) and as if they have certain features (ibid.,
p.234). Thomson-Jones’s argument then proceeds as follows:
[B1] Either there are abstract objects such as the simple pendulum or not.
[B2] If there are, then [t] should be taken literally.
[B3] If there are not, then scientific modelling does not involve such objects
and therefore [t] should not be understood literally.
[B4] If there are no abstract objects but [t] is true nonetheless, then it is
not obvious what [t] means.
[B5] If we do not know whether there are abstract objects, we cannot know
whether the account of modelling is to be taken literally.
[B6] Therefore, we cannot claim to have arrived at an understanding of
modelling by invoking such an account in the midst of such a funda-
mental uncertainty about the actual meaning of [t].
[B7] Removing that uncertainty will at least involve answering the existence
question about abstract objects.
[B8] Therefore, bracketing is not an available option.
As it stands, the argument is supposedly directed against all possible
ways of bracketing metaphysics in philosophy – i.e. by taking an agnostic
stance towards metaphysical existence related questions, by explicitly deny-
ing the existence of abstract entities like the fictionalists do, or by taking
a Carnapian approach. The gist of the objection is that no matter which
approach one takes for bracketing the (external theoretical) question of on-
tology, [t] is always left unexplained. This is because [T] is an attempt
to explain what models are and how they are related to their targets by
involving talk of abstract entities. Therefore, the (external) ontology of
these entities plays, according to Thomson-Jones, an important role. This
is reflected in [C1] which echoes what Thomson-Jones calls the ‘existence
question’ about abstract objects. To claim that they do exist, is to make an
ontological commitment and thus – as [C2] shows – [T] as a theory of mod-
els provides an understanding and a possible true explanation given that
[t] is true. However, any attempt to refuse engaging with the metaphysical
question of the existence of abstract entities leaves us with uncertainty as to
the actual meaning of [T] and thus, according to Thomson-Jones, provides
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little understanding. [C3] and [C4] clearly aim for the fictionalist, and [C5]
targets the agnostic approach.17
What about the Carnapian approach however? Thomson-Jones does
not engage with this option in detail, and the reason is that he presupposes
that the (external theoretical) existence question, on which [C1] relies, is a
legitimate question to ask. That is, he presupposes that it is a matter of fact
that abstract entities either exist or not. However, this is exactly what the
Carnapian pragmatist denies and thus the argument breaks down at its very
starting point. For the Carnapian pragmatist, the external theoretical ques-
tion of the existence of abstract entities is a non-cognitive pseudo-question.
Insofar as this question cannot be formulated in a way that makes it cogni-
tively intelligible, it is simply inappropriate and it should be discarded.
Thomson-Jones justifies [C1] by saying that ‘when evaluating an ac-
count which engages the as-if practice for X’s [e.g. abstract objects], it is
prima facie entirely reasonable to ask, as part of the evaluation, whether
there are indeed X’s, and if so, whether they are the right sort of thing to
play the roles the core account would seem to require them’ (ibid., p.248).
But this assumption only leaves the Carnapian wondering. What does it
mean for an abstract entity to exist? And how can we ever tell whether an
abstract entity exists or not? More importantly, what is the difference be-
tween an existing abstract entity and a non-existing abstract entity? Until
we find an appropriate way to answer these questions in a meaningful and
constructive fashion, they cannot be considered as legitimate, let alone as
an indispensable part of a theory of scientific models.
In fairness to Thomson-Jones, he clearly states that he is not arguing
that our philosophical enquiries should be put on hold until we reach a
definite answer to these questions. What he is arguing for is that we have
to acknowledge that the answer to one question (say to the question of the
ontology of models) ‘depends in part on the answer to a number of other,
equally difficult and uncertain questions’ (ibid., p.234). And a sensible way
of coping with such difficult situations is to make a working hypothesis, a sort
of ‘educated bet’, and develop our theories based on that assumption. One
is left wondering however, whether there is any practical difference between
this educated guess about the nature of models and the introduction of what
one takes to be the most efficient linguistic framework for a given aim.
Insofar as external ontological questions cannot be formulated in com-
mon scientific language in a way that makes them cognitively intelligible,
to introduce a tentative answer to such questions – say to make a working
assumption of the sort ‘models are existing abstract objects’ – looks more
like giving a pseudo-answer, as Stein has aptly noted (1989, p.54); and it
17It is not my purpose to defend a fictionalist approach to modelling here, however it
is worth mentioning that with regard to [C4], this is exactly what the fictionalist’s theory
aims to explain by appealing to pretence and games of make-believe.
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is highly doubtful whether such claims provide the kind of understanding
Thomson-Jones is seeking for, according to his own principles. Recall that
Thomson-Jones’ criticism to the fictionalist (premise [C4]) is that given that
[T] contains a claim which is literally false, an important part of this theory
remains unexplained, or even worse, false. Does the introduction of an exter-
nal assertion as a working hypothesis make things better however? Stein’s
point is that what is actually happening in these cases, is that a supposedly
explanatory notion is introduced which when examined carefully is found
to be in effect completely disconnected from the explanandum (hence the
‘pseudo-answer’). In other words, given our inability to provide a robust
meaning to such metaphysical existential claims, these claims fail in pro-
viding a satisfactory explanation as part of our theory. The solution is to
see the hypothesis of the existing abstract entity merely as a linguistic tool
which facilitates our talk of scientific models, and not as a serious ontological
commitment in the metaphysician’s sense.
6 Conclusion
This paper is a result of the observation that a significant part of the liter-
ature on modelling and scientific representation concerns the metaphysical
implications of the debate on the ontology of models. This fact gives the
further impression that these matters are closely associated with a number
of persisting problems in traditional metaphysics, such as the existence of
abstract objects and the nature of properties. Following Carnap, the sugges-
tion here is to see the question of the ontology of models as either an internal
theoretical question within an already accepted linguistic framework or an
external practical question regarding the choice of the most efficient the-
ory in order to explain and understand certain features of scientific models.
The main implication of this suggestion is that the question of the ontol-
ogy of models is only a means of probing other related questions regarding
the overall practice of scientific modelling and the function of models as
epistemological tools for gaining knowledge about the physical world. The
choice between competing theories therefore depends solely on the relevant
pragmatic criteria and the specific desiderata of each account.
The framing of the debate on the ontology of models in Carnapian terms
nicely illustrates how Carnap’s approach is still relevant for contemporary
discussions in the philosophy of science and that several lessons can be drawn
from it. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned is that before
setting out to answer a philosophical question, we should first pause and
think what the question is really asking and what we seek to understand
by exploring the possible answers to it. This way we can avoid ‘the danger
of getting into useless philosophical controversies’ (Carnap, 1935, p.76) that
Carnap was trying so hard to abolish. A fruitful debate is one in which all
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parts have a clear and common understanding of the problem in hand, and
the nature of the debate on the ontology of models shows that this might not
be the case. What is being put forward here by appealing to a Carnapian
take on the debate is not an outright quietism about the ontology of models.
Rather, it is a gentle reminder that there is nothing to be gained by trying
to settle down to a unique answer on the question of the ontology of models.
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Suárez, M. (2004). An inferential conception of scientific representation.
Philosophy of science 71 (5), 767–779.
Suppes, P. (1960). A comparison of the meaning and uses of models in
mathematics and the empirical sciences. Synthese 12, 287–301.
Teller, P. (2001). Twilight Of The Perfect Model Model. Erkenntnis 55 (3),
393–415.
Teller, P. (2018). Making worlds with symbols. Synthese.
Thomasson, A. L. (2006). Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are
We Doing Here? Philosophy Compass 1 (3), 245–255.
Thomasson, A. L. (2014). Ontology made easy. Oxford University Press.
Thomson-Jones, M. (2010). Missing systems and the face value practice.
Synthese 172 (2), 283–299.
Thomson-Jones, M. (2017). Against Bracketing and Complacency. In
M. Slater and Z. Yudell (Eds.), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, pp. 229–251. New York: Oxford University Press.
25
Toon, A. (2010). The ontology of theoretical modelling: Models as make-
believe. Synthese 172 (2), 301–315.
Toon, A. (2012). Models as Make-Believe: Imagination, Fiction and Scien-
tific Representation. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Inwagen, P. (2020). The neo-Carnapians. Synthese 197 (1), 7–32.
van Roojen, M. (2018). Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism. In E. N.
Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 ed.).
Verhaegh, S. (2017). Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal-
External Distinction. Erkenntnis 82 (4), 873–890.
Verhaegh, S. (2018). Working from Within: The Nature and Development
of Quine’s Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yablo, S. (1998). Does Ontology rest on a mistake? Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume 72 (1), 229–261.
26
